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Abstract Referendums have experienced some sort of a comeback. Citizen
involvement in political decisions is seen increasingly as a healthy add-on in
democratic polities. While earlier writers on democratic theory often saw a danger
in increased participation of citizens, more recently several authors suggest that this
participation should be fostered. I argue in this paper that both sides in the debate
neglect important aspects of referendums. Discussing whether direct participation
by the citizens is a good or bad thing addresses only half the story. More precisely,
we have to get a better idea about how referendums interact with the traditional
institutions of representative democracy.
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1 Introduction
Over the last few years referendums1 have experienced a comeback at several
levels. On the practical side referendums have increased in frequency ‘‘around the
world’’ (Butler and Ranney 1994b), and several newly adopted constitutions, e.g., in
some East European (Brady and Kaplan 1994; White and Hill 1996) and Latin
American countries (Altman 2005), comprise provisions for popular consultation.
At the scholarly level, the last few years have seen the publication of numerous
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1 Following Butler and Ranney (1994a, b) I use the term referendum to cover all instances where citizens
vote on specific policies.
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books and studies on referendums (e.g., Suksi 1993; Butler and Ranney 1994b;
Caciagli and Uleri 1994; Luthardt 1994; Mo¨ckli 1994; Hamon 1995; Gallagher and
Uleri 1996; Gerber 1999; Kirchga¨ssner et al. 1999; Seta¨la¨ 1999; Broder 2000;
Sabato et al. 2001; Qvortrup 2002; Walker 2003; Matsusaka 2004).2 Finally,
politicians and scholars alike have recently proposed referendums to mend all sorts
of problems. From Barber (1984) over Dahl (1989) to Budge (1996) authors have
seen possibilities in the new informational technologies for direct consultation of the
citizens on policy choices. Similarly, in the realm of the European integration
project several politicians and researchers have suggested that pan-European
referendums might reduce the often decried ‘‘democratic deficit’’ in the European
Union (EU) (Zu¨rn 1996; Abromeit 1998; Schmitter 2000).3
While recent research continues to shed new light on the working of
referendums, I argue in this paper that so far we fail to have a sufficient
understanding of these institutions to engage in grandiose proposals for extending
their use. More precisely, so far little research has addressed the issue how
referendums affect the representative governments that prevail in all democratic
states around the world. My contention is that this poor state of research on
referendums is largely due to persistent flaws in the debate on the usefulness of
direct participation of citizens in policy choices. Proponents of referendums fail to
address convincingly the interactions referendums create between the representative
system and the elements of direct citizen participation. Often they see referendums
as simply ensuring that the ‘‘will of the citizens’’ is respected.4 Opponents, on the
other hand, persist in rejecting referendums as if the alternatives would be direct
democracy5 and representative government. Similarly, they continue to invoke the
incapability of citizens to make meaningful policy choices, while not noticing that
this critique also questions the basis of representative democracy.
The aim of this paper is twofold. First, I would like to demonstrate that the
ongoing debate about the usefulness or the detrimental effects of referendums is
largely flawed. With their arguments both sides largely miss the crucial point,
namely that the fundamental choice has to be between a pure representative system
and a similar system combined with referendums. Second and based on this
argument, I would like to highlight the implications of such a reorientation of this
debate for the research agenda on referendums. The interaction between specific
representative systems and the various types of referendums will be of predominant
importance.
2 Lupia and Matsusaka (2004) provide a very well crafted review of the literature. See also Matsusaka
(2005a, b).
3 For an overview see Hug (2002).
4 Riker (1983) offers a thorough critique of this view.
5 I use the term direct democracy in its original sense as the opposite of representative democracy.
Consequently, in a direct democracy representative institutions do not exist. This is quite different to
Budge’s (1993, p. 137), re-definition of the term as ‘‘…a regime in which the population as a whole votes
on the most important political decisions.’’ Such a re-definition lends to confusion, since Budge’s (1993,
1996) proposals include the maintenance of a representative system where elected parties can pass their
programs shielded to a certain degree from the referendum process.
At the national level no direct democracy exists, while at the subnational level some ‘‘direct
democracies’’ persist, e.g., in some Swiss cantons and in some New England townships (Cronin 1989).
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I start in the next section to sketch the debate on referendums. This section
also contains a discussion of the research in this field, since most proponents
and opponents of these institutions rely (often selectively) on theoretical and
empirical work to make their claims. In section three I discuss in more detail
what both theoretical and empirical work has failed to address so far. I conclude
with discussing the use of referendums in the larger frame of institutional
design.
2 The debate
As Dahl (1989) convincingly argues the notion of ‘‘democracy’’ has undergone
significant changes since its conception in Greece. His thought experiment of a
Greek citizen from 500 B.C. visiting a current democracy is revealing in this
regard (Dahl 1989, p. 20). Such a man (definitely not a woman) would hardly
call our political systems democratic, since crucial elements, e.g., direct
involvement of citizens, deliberation among them, etc., are clearly missing.
The reason for this is to be found in the ‘‘second democratic transformation’’,
which extended the idea of democracy from city-states to nation-states. With this
transformation also came the system of representation, which nowadays is
inseparable from the notion of democracy.6 Even fierce critics of this liberal
view of democracy (e.g., Barber 1984) acknowledge that democracy at the level
of the nation-states we currently know in this world implies at least some degree
of representative government.
Consequently, the debate about referendums should revolve around the question
to what extent our democratic systems of representation should be and can be
complemented by more direct means of citizen influence. Similarly, proposals by
scholars and political observers typically attempt to add referendums to existing
systems of representative democracy. And it is obviously in this context that the
arguments for or against referendums have to be made and evaluated.
Interestingly, however, much of the continuing debate on referendums focuses
on opposing representative democracy to referendums. Such a debate is, however,
rather lopsided, irrelevant and should be reoriented toward a discussion about the
respective advantages of a strictly representative democracy and a representative
democracy with referendums (e.g., Uleri 1996). But this comparison hardly
appears in the debate and has seldomly stimulated research on referendums.7
Comparative research almost exclusively focuses on countries having some forms
of referendums.8 By this very character of the research designs, these studies do
6 Manin (1997) would obviously disagree with this view by emphasizing that even in the Greek city-
states representation was well known. The representatives, however, were not elected but drawn
randomly from the citizenry.
7 A recent and important exception at the theoretical level is Mueller’s (1996) discussion of how different
types of referendums interact with two-party and multiparty governments. I will discuss this exception, as
well as Feldmann’s (1995) and Hug and Tsebelis’s (2002) similar approach, below.
8 Gilland Lutz and Hug (2006), Blume et al. (2007) and Hug and Spo¨rri (2007) offer some of the first
empirical results at this level.
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not allow for conclusions on how representative democracy is affected by
referendums.9
To structure the presentation of the debate on referendums I rely on two central
concepts. Distorting slightly Frey’s (1996, p. 267) argument, the case for and against
referendums revolves around the principles of efficiency and trust. Proponents of
referendums claim that these institutional provisions foster trust among citizens and
increase the efficiency of decisions. Opponents reject the first argument and claim that
efficiency is higher in purely representative democracy. Despite the fact that at least
one of these two notions stems from economics, I maintain that both of them subsume
to a large degree the arguments in favor of and against referendums across disciplines.
While both camps might feel that some violence to their subtle arguments is made, I
structure my sketch of the debate according to these two notions.
2.1 Trust and referendums
Starting with the second notion, the main argument of proponents of ‘‘participatory
democracy’’ has consistently been that participation in political decisions turns
citizens into better citizens. Pateman (1970), in her detailed discussion of the several
‘‘democratic theories,’’ extracts clearly this important argument from the writings of
several theorists.10 Barber (1984) bases his case for a ‘‘strong democracy’’ on
exactly the same claim. While theoretically there might be some reason to believe
that this is actually the case, at the empirical level the case still has to be made.11
Few, if any studies, can demonstrate that participation by citizens in decision-
making has a formative value and makes them better citizens.12 More recently Benz
and Stutzer (2004) have found some evidence that citizens that have more of a say
in political decision-making appear to be better informed on politics. Similar claims
appear in Tolber et al. (2003, 2005) for the case of American citizens.13
9 At the subnational level research on Switzerland and the United States has been able to disentangle
some of these effects. While in Switzerland the variation at the cantonal level is rather limited, this very
same variation is much more important in the United States. Research by Matsusaka (1995, 2000, 2004,
2006) and Gerber (1996, 1999) illustrates this forcefully. Interestingly, despite the higher leverage of their
studies these authors largely refrain from generalizing their findings to the national level. Similar restraint
and degree of scientific prudence are largely absent among scholars studying the effect of referendums at
the subnational level in Switzerland. Kleinewefers (1997) comes to a similar conclusion when reviewing
this literature.
10 Interestingly, authors citing Pateman (1970) consistently use her work as argument for participatory
democracy. They seem happy to neglect the rather nuanced assessment of Pateman (1970), and her
careful discussion of empirical material which hardly supports the idea that participation makes citizens
better citizens. The literature on economic democracy is also hardly supportive of this claim (Greenberg
1981; Dahl 1985). Sartori (1962) is obviously an even fiercer critic of the underlying argument: ‘‘…one
does not learn how to vote by voting.’’
11 Even Putnam’s (1993) controversial study of Italy leaves this question open.
12 Frey (1996, p. 273) argues that the empirical result of higher tax-compliance in ‘‘directly democratic’’
cantons in Switzerland speaks in favor of this argument. The fact that the variance in ‘‘direct democracy’’
is very limited across cantons (e.g., Kriesi and Wisler 1996) and that this variance is also linked to the
linguistic region (e.g., Feld 1996) makes this a very weak claim.
13 These results are discussed in more detail in Smith and Tolbert (2004). In both instances, however,
hardly sufficient care is given to the possible endogenous nature of referendum institutions.
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The parallel and related claim that the involvement of citizens in decision-
making processes leads to public deliberation approaching the ‘‘ideal discourse’’
(e.g., Frey and Kirchga¨ssner 1993; Bohnet and Frey 1994; Frey 1996) is
theoretically appealing. The argument is that the discussion preceding public votes
changes the preferences of the individuals to reflect wider aspects of the issue at
hand. These new preferences will reflect to a much larger degree the well-being of
others than the individuals’ self-interest. Barber (1984, p. 136f) in his argument for
‘‘strong democracy’’ gives an illustrative example:
Voting suggests a group of men in a cafeteria bargaining about what they can
buy as a group that will suit their individual tastes. Strong democracy politics
suggests a group of men in a cafeteria contriving new menus, inventing new
recipes, and experimenting with new diets in the effort to create a public taste
that they can all share and that will supersede the conflicting private tastes
about which they once tried to strike bargains.
Assuming that such ‘‘public tastes’’ exist and can be found, the argument is rather
appealing.14 Obviously, if one can assume that these ‘‘public tastes’’ exist; it is
rather irrelevant how they will be found. If the debate before a referendum allows
for the formation of such ‘‘tastes’’ a vote is hardly necessary. It suffices to determine
the public’s taste by appropriate means after the deliberation. List et al. (2006),
based on work on deliberative polls, argue that deliberation at least leads to single-
peaked preferences when multiple options are available in a referendum. Hence, a
median-voter is well-defined and might be indicative of the public’s ‘‘tastes.’’ This
interesting result, however, is obtained in a situation where the decisional pressure
was rather low. As Chambers (2001) nicely alerts us, however, the benefits of
deliberation often evaporate, when the decision-making moment arrives.
Given this it is questionable whether large-scale deliberations and discussions as
envisioned by Frey and Kirchga¨ssner (1993) and Budge (1996) are the most
efficient means to determine the relevant ‘‘social’’ preferences. Baurmann and
Kliemt (1993), in their comment on Frey and Kirchga¨ssner (1993), mention briefly
this point. Hence, it is rather ironic that Frey and Kirchga¨ssner (1993) and Frey
(1996) question Habermas, who theorized the notion of ‘‘ideal discourse,’’ when he
claims that a debate in the German Bundestag approximates his concept. Obviously,
Habermas, more than Frey and Kirchga¨ssner (1993) and Budge (1996) for that
matter, is conscious of the limitations of large-scale deliberations.
More interesting are proposals that envision deliberation at a smaller scale. For
example, Barber (1984), Dahl (1989) and Fishkin (1991) envision random selections
of individuals debate and deliberate about important issues of their concern. But these
are quite separate from extending the use of large-scale citizen participation. Only
Dahl (1989) in his ‘‘polyarchy III,’’ and Budge (1996) in his more extreme version see
new technologies overcoming the difficulties of large-scale deliberation.15
14 An interesting, related, result is presented in List et al. (2006). These authors find that in after
deliberative poll (Fishkin 1991) the preferences of the participants approached much more strongly a
structure allowing for single-peakedness over three options. In this context also the analyses proposed by
Lupia and Johnston (2001) on the informational consequences of referendums is of relevance.
15 I will discuss these proposals in more detail in the next section.
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Few of them note that the ‘‘large-scale’’ they have in mind can hardly apply to a
modern nation-state. Even in the realm of these proposals I doubt that it will ever be
possible to demonstrate that referendums and the campaigns that precede them lead
to ‘‘public tastes’’ and allow for an ‘‘ideal discourse.’’16 Similarly, I doubt that any
proponent of direct democracy would like to ground his argument only on this
element of ‘‘trust.’’17
A final point which stands a bit apart, mostly because it is rather undisputed and
concerns the greater legitimacy conferred to decisions reached in a public vote. I
doubt that any participant in the debate would question this point, opponents would
probably note that such publicly legitimized decisions are just much more likely to
be misguided (e.g., Weber 1956, 1921).
2.2 Efficiency and referendums
The question of efficiency appears to be more powerful but also more controversial.
Proponents of referendums rest their case on the argument that votes by citizens on
policies in referendums lead automatically to policies that reflect more accurately the
will of the majority. Intuitively this appears to be obvious, since voters will choose the
option that they prefer. Theoretical and empirical work by Romer and Rosenthal (1978,
1979) shows, however, that referendums also create strategic possibilities for the agenda-
setter, the actor who decides what will appear on the ballot. This agenda-setter can act
strategically in such a way that the outcomes of referendums hardly reflect the will of the
majority.18 Most proponents of referendums will retort to this theoretical and empirical
claim, that agenda-setting power should also be vested among the citizens, to avoid such
distortions. This valid argument illustrates the need to clearly distinguish between
different types of referendum, which influence quite consistently their efficiency (e.g.,
Steunenberg 1992; Mueller 1996; Hug and Tsebelis 2002; Hug 2004). In the absence of
such clear distinctions the welfare implications are simply impossible to determine. Both
theoretical and empirical research in this area is still very weak and hardly permits claims
that referendums generally lead to more efficiency.19
Opponents of referendums challenge the claim for increased efficiency under
referendums from another point of view. Authors from Weber (1956, 1921) over
Schumpeter (1942) to Dahl (1989) and Sartori (1962, 1987) argue that citizens
16 One should also note that empirical evidence from the American states suggests that preferences
appear to change little in the course of a campaign (Gerber 1999).
17 Barber’s (1984) proposals for a strong democracy might be the exception, since he believes in the
possible discovery of public tastes through deliberation. Consequently, efficiency becomes almost a side-
product of the trust-forming aspects of referendums.
18 Given that Romer and Rosenthal’s (1978, 1979) work relies on a spatial model the will of the majority
appears as the median-voter. Rosenthal (1990) reviews the literature on agenda-setting.
19 Frey (1996, p. 272) argues that ‘‘…results from various countries, periods, areas and issues strongly
suggest that the institutions of popular initiatives and referenda are not only preferable from the point of
view of democratic theory but also from a more narrowly economic point of view.’’ The studies he refers
to cover Switzerland and the United States. In both cases the institutions examined are at the subnational
level, and it is difficult to know whether these economically beneficial effects of referendums generalize
to the national or supranational level (Kleinewefers 1997). Though Frey (1992) dares to suggest that the
economic success of Switzerland is linked to the high number of referendums at the national level.
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hardly have or can obtain the expertise to decide on complex matters that are the
daily bread of politicians. According to them representative democracy solved the
problem of the difficulty of large-scale discussion and the expertise necessary to
decide on such matters. They assume that the competition among politicians and
parties in the electoral realm is sufficient to keep them in check. Proponents of
referendums, most recently Budge (1996) and Mueller (1996, p. 189), make the
convincing argument that this claim is groundless. Why should citizens be able to
hold politicians accountable in informed electoral decisions, if they are unable to
decide adequately on specific policy issues. At the outset it might prove to be more
difficult to reach a decision in an election than in a referendum. Downs (1957) made
a convincing argument for the presence of ideological shortcuts in elections, and
similar shortcuts are just as viable in referendums (e.g., Lupia 1994; Christin et al.
2002; Kriesi 2005).
The discussion around the efficiency relies heavily on the notion of preferences,
but oftentimes the use of this notion conflicts. Both proponents and opponents of
referendums agree that these preferences diverge between citizens and represen-
tatives. Both opponents and proponents most often specify rather poorly the
mechanisms that lead to these divergences. The mechanisms they have in mind
differ, however, consistently. Proponents of referendums make the case that the
voters’ representatives develop different preferences as soon as they are elected.
They become more interested in staying in office and extending their powers.
Consequently, referendums provide a useful check on politicians to insure that the
will of the citizens is respected. Opponents of referendums, as discussed above,
suggest that the voters’ preferences as they transpire in vote choices only reflect
their partial knowledge of the alternatives at hand. If it were possible to turn every
citizen into a policy specialist, the preferences of citizens and representatives would
be completely aligned. Since opponents of referendums argue that citizens cannot
all become policy specialists, preferences revealed in referendums and the
preferences of representatives are likely to diverge.
A related argument revolves around the possibility of bargaining. Baurmann and
Kliemt (1993), for instance, suggest that contrary to a participatory democracy, a
representative democracy allows for bargaining to find solutions that are Pareto-
improvements. Linking several issue areas bargains might be made which increase
the welfare of all citizens. In the absence of such bargains in a parliament it might
be the case that on each issue area the majority wins, but that over all issue areas a
better (Pareto-superior) solution might be found.20 At the level of a representative
organ such bargains are probably easier to strike and to uphold than in a large-scale
citizenry. Simply because the transaction costs involved are much smaller.21
A final note on the efficiency argument relates to the opponents’ idea that
referendums weaken representative government. While on the surface this seems
like a convincing argument, beneath it the argument begins to unravel. First, it is
20 Work by Brams et al. (1997) and Lacy and Niou (2000) indirectly address this issue by showing how
votes over multiple issues may lead to counterintuitive results. They also provide empirical illustrations
from votes in American states. See also Nurmi (1997, 1998).
21 Gerber (1999) makes a similar point when arguing that deliberation can only occur in a representative
body.
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largely unclear what a weakened representative government means, and whether
this is efficiency enhancing (what some economists would be happy to argue)22
or decreasing (as probably a few scholars would argue). Probably the argument
assumes that in a pure representative democracy parliament can act more
independently and quicker than in a representative democracy with referendums.
On the theoretical level, however, this argument has not yet been made in a
convincing manner, and at the empirical level the case also still has to be
made.23
2.3 Summary
From this very partial (in both senses of its meanings) overview of the debate on
referendums three conclusions appears forcefully. First, the case for referendums
must rest on the criterion of efficiency. In the absence of any clear empirical way
to determine whether certain institutions lead to better citizens, the trust-
argument for referendums remains theoretical. And at that level it has the same
value as any another theoretical claim. Second, based on the criterion of
efficiency the case for referendums is not yet made. At the empirical level, some
research indicates that in two particular federal systems, referendums at the
subnational level appear to have positive economic effects. Recent research on
referendums also demonstrates, however, that often the decisions reached fail to
reflect the will of the majority (e.g., Romer and Rosenthal 1978; Gruner and
Hertig 1983; Brams et al. 1997; Lacy and Niou 2000).24 Third, the efficiency of
referendums cannot be assessed in the absence of clear distinctions between
different forms of referendums and their interaction with the established
representative system.25
3 A critical assessment of research
Students of referendums oftentimes become infatuated with their object of study.
They see citizens becoming active and deciding on policy issues that are of
22 In an interesting article in favor of proportional representation (PR) Lijphart (1994) argues that the
supposedly weakening effect of PR might actually lead to economically beneficial effects. On a more
curious level Frey (1996), citing Wittman’s (1995) work as support of the efficiency enhancing effects of
referendums, neglects completely the fact that the argument is made with respect to representative
democracies.
23 A few stylized examples often appear in this discussion, for instance the late introduction of women’s
suffrage in Switzerland (in 1971 at the national level) or the same country’s timid involvement in foreign
affairs (e.g., absence from UN, late membership of IMF and World Bank, etc.). Such stylized facts,
however, hardly add up to a rigorous test of the argument.
24 Interestingly Barber (1984) suggests in his manifest for a strong democracy the possibility for choices
among different proposals. This increases, however, the possibilities of inconsistencies and cycles in
decision-making.
25 Mueller (1996) is probably one of the first scholars discussing these interactions in detail. His




immediate concern to them. Obviously this is a rather appealing picture, and seems
much closer to what the term democracy originally meant. Too quickly they forget,
however, that in the background a representative system continues to work with all
its merits and faults. And exactly at this crucial juncture the research on
referendums has failed so far. Scientifically we know very little about how
referendums interact with the institutions of a representative democracy.
The reasons for this sorry state of research can be pinned down to a series of
reasons. First, as sketched out above, the debate on the usefulness of referendums
has largely avoided this crucial question. This is all the more surprising since early
students of referendums were very much attuned to this important research question
(Key and Crouch 1939).26 Second, too often theoretical and empirical research
focuses completely on political systems that have provisions for referendums.
Obviously, under these circumstances it is impossible to assess the impact of
referendums on representative democracy, since the relevant ‘‘control group,’’
namely purely representative systems, are missing. Third, too often referendums are
conceived as a uniform category of popular votes. There exists, however,
considerable variation among different types of popular votes, each of which is
likely to interact differently with a representative democracy. Failing to distinguish
these effects is detrimental to any serious research effort. Finally, at the empirical
level it is often difficult to disentangle these very same effects, for the simple reason
that the different forms of referendums often appear in very few countries. For
instance, at the beginning of the 1990s, Suksi (1993) found only six countries of a
set of 161 with constitutional provisions that allow citizens to put forward a
legislative or constitutional project. Of these six countries, five also have institutions
that allow citizens to ask for a vote on measures adopted by parliament. Such a state
of affair makes it very difficult to test empirically any theoretically derived
hypothesis. Luckily enough, as mentioned above, recent institutional changes have
changed this situation a bit.27 Even with this improvement, however, it is still clear
that precise theoretical models for studying the effect of different types of
referendums are required.
On this point, unfortunately, research is rather mute. To my knowledge only
few recent research efforts attempt to study the interactions between represen-
tative systems and referendums. The broadest attempt appears in Mueller’s
(1996) study on ‘‘constitutional democracy.’’ In his discussion on referendums he
clearly emphasizes that they have to be considered in their interaction with the
representative part of the political system. Throughout his book he distinguishes,
partly relying on Lijphart’s (1994) distinction, between two-party and multiparty
systems. These systems interact quite differently with the four forms of
referendum that Mueller (1996, p. 179f) distinguishes: ‘‘1. The constitutionally
mandated referendum…. 2. The government-initiated referendum…. 3. The
citizen-iniated veto…. 4. The citizen initiative.’’ His theoretical argument
26 Gerber and Hug (2001) discuss this issue in more detail.
27 Empirical research by Gilland Lutz and Hug (2006), Blume et al. (2007) and Hug and Spo¨rri (2007)
take advantage of these changes and find to some extend similar results as other scholars have found at the
subnational level.
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suggests that referendums on constitutional amendments adopted by a supra-
majority might be useful to lend increased legitimacy to both types of
representative system, while the case for government-initiated referendums is
more mixed. In both systems such referendums lend themselves to abuses, which
Mueller (1996) judges to be more important in two-party systems. Finally, the
referendums initiated by citizens, according to Mueller (1996, p. 190), ‘‘can
function as a check on the government.’’
A related attempt is proposed by Hug and Tsebelis (2002). Building on
Tsebelis’s (2002) ‘‘veto player theory’’ these authors assess how different types of
referendums strengthen or weaken certain actors in a representative democracy.
This information can be used to predict whether policy outcomes should be more
or less stable and whether a convergence to the voters’ preferences is to be
observed. While both Mueller’s (1996) and Hug and Tsebelis’s (2002) theoretical
argument relies loosely on the public choice literature on referendums, Feldmann
(1995) provides an explicit model of bargaining in a legislature. He studies this
model under two assumptions. Under the first one the legislative outcome is the
final policy. Under the second, citizens or an interest group might launch an
initiative and challenge the adopted policy in the legislature. His results suggest
that the possibility of direct legislation affects considerably the bargaining
occurring in the legislature. More precisely, he finds that specialization of
legislators decreases in a system that allows for citizen-initiated referendums.
Since bargains struck in a committee of a legislature can easily become unstuck
in a referendum, individual legislators have less incentives to invest in
specialization.
This issue of specialization comes also to the fore when we consider referendums
in a principal-agent framework. In a purely representative system in a such
framework a chain of delegations from the voters to parliament, the government etc.
exists (Strøm et al. 2003). As Strøm et al. (2003) (see especially Strøm 2003) nicely
demonstrate, this chain of delegation is accompanied by a chain of accountability
running in the opposite direction. In a purely representative system voters exert their
right for accountability either at fixed intervals or in intervals decided by
governments or parliaments in elections. Hence, the only political control that
voters exert is the equivalent of a ‘‘police patrol’’ in the jargon of principal-agent
work on bureaucracy (McCubbins et al. 1987). This ‘‘police patrol,’’ with the voters
at the steering-wheel is only on the roads, however, at fixed or endogenously
determined intervals.28
Such a weak measure of accountability has its advantages and disadvantages.29
Given that the ‘‘police patrols’’ in elections explicitly determine the composition,
and thus the preferences of the voters’ agent, agency-drift will occur only over time.
Given that the next round of ‘‘police patrols’’ is years away, this might lead to
28 Obviously, there are other accountability processes built into any purely representative system, but
these other ones, like the courts or ombudsman-procedures, are also present in other systems.
29 Similar reasonings appear also in Maskin and Tirole (2004).
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considerable agency-drift. On the other hand, precisely because of this rather
lengthy interval till the next election, the agents (i.e., parliaments, governments etc.)
have strong incentives to become informed and specialize.30
Adding to such a purely representative system instruments of direct legislation
that are not completely controlled by the agents leads to the creation of a set of
‘‘fire alarms’’ (McCubbins et al. 1987). More precisely, the actors entitled to
trigger a referendum will act as ‘‘fire alarms’’ for agency-drift. While such
institutions will obviously reduce agency-drift in the rather lengthy intervals
between elections, they also have their disadvantages. First and foremost,
increasing the possibilities of sanctioning the agents reduces obviously the latter’s
incentives to get informed and specialized.31 Second, the agents will obviously
have an incentive to collude with the actors being able to trigger a referendum, if
possible, to avoid popular scrutiny.32
Related reasonings are offered by Hugh-Jones (2007) when analyzing formally
the way in which policy learning and yardstick competition interact among sets of
representative and direct democracies. His interesting conclusion, namely that for
the overall welfare of the voters a system with only direct democracies is not
optimal, hinges on the fact that in such system not sufficient policy experimentation,
and thus no learning would occur. This occurs simply because if only direct
democracies are present, all voters will have the same information and no
representative is willing to make a policy experiment.
While these studies focus on the crucial interaction between a representative
system and referendums, an important element still remains unaddressed, namely
whether and why the preferences of citizens should be at odds with those of
legislators. The assumption that they are at odds underlies most recent formal work
on referendums (e.g., Steunenberg 1992; Gerber 1996; Matsusaka and McCarty
2001; Hug 2004; Kessler 2005). While intuitively this makes sense, the extent to
which and the reason why these preferences differ is hardly addressed and studied at
the theoretical level. Since proponents and opponents of referendums have different
reasons for assuming differences in preferences, however, theoretical models should
start focusing on the mechanisms that might explain them. Obviously models of the
legislative process exist that address these issues (most recently Baron 1998), but so
far they have not been linked with the process of referendums. A first innovative
attempt appears in Besley and Coate (2001), who attempt exactly to explain why
citizens might have diverging interests from those of their representative. The
empirical referent, however, is still largely limited, and the need for more work is
clearly visible.
30 This was obviously the intent in all democratic systems with some sort of delegation, i.e., even in the
Greek city-states (Manin 1997).
31 Might this be an additional explanation for why the country with the most national referendums (i.e.,
Switzerland) also has a semi-professional parliament? The model proposed by Feldmann (1995) would
partly support this contention.
32 Both the model of Matsusaka and McCarty (2001) and Hug (2004) demonstrate at the theoretical level
that such collusion might occur.
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Consequently, the research effort should focus increasingly on linking models of
the legislative process with models of the referendum process.33 In linking these
models careful attention has to be paid to the various forms of referendums.
Mandatory referendums on constitutional questions are likely to have considerably
different impacts on the legislative process than citizen-initiated referendums.34
4 Conclusion
The lopsided debate about the usefulness of referendums has had two detrimental
effects. First, it has led the discussion to a dead-end, and second, it has led research
on referendums to neglect the fundamental questions that should be addressed. Both
effects are detrimental especially in the present day where questions of institutional
design have come to the forefront. A series of newly democratized countries
engaged in efforts to rewrite their constitutions and look for institutions that might
fit their needs. When reading the literature on referendums these constitutional
framers would have come to a rather disheartening conclusion. Even when starting
from similar premises (e.g. diverging preferences between citizens and the
representative government) proponents and opponents of referendums arrive at
completely opposing conclusions. Similarly empirical research has rather consis-
tently failed so far to address the crucial question whether a pure representative
democracy is preferable (on whatever grounds) to a representative democracy
combined with referendums.
It can hardly surprise then that the experiences by the newly democratized
countries (e.g., in Eastern Europe and Latin America) with referendums are rather
mixed. Some have adopted successfully their new constitutions in referendums with
considerable popular participation. In other cases constitutional changes were forced
down the throats of the citizens in hardly pleasing to watch expressions of the will
of the people. While it might be that the involved politicians actively sought these
referendums with their positive and negative aspects, it is as plausible that the
consequences of their choices were largely unintended.
This suggests, as I highlighted in this paper, that the research effort in the field of
referendums is in serious need of a reorientation. Such a reorientation would address
more directly how different types of referendums interact with the prevalent forms
of representative democracy. Studying this interaction both at the theoretical and
empirical level might also lift the current debate about referendums from its muddy
level. With the help of new theoretical and empirical insights, proposals for
extending or curtailing the use of referendums would gain in credibility and could
33 Feldmann’s (1995) work is a first attempt in this direction, but he has to derive the legislature’s
preference from a reduced form model. Consequently, the mechanisms that determine the preferences of
the legislators are not addressed directly.
34 Mueller (1996) addresses this question directly, but his discussion of the differences in preferences
among legislature and citizens is rather superficial. He mainly distinguishes two-party from multiparty
systems, where the former leads to governments representing the majority of the citizens, while in the
latter coalition bargaining is assumed to lead to diverging preferences. The question of legislative
specialization and bargaining is not addressed at all in this context.
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be based on sounder foundations. As a positive side-effect the discipline might give
some helpful advice to designers of new institution. This advice might well be
provisional and tentative, but at least it would rely on a debate that shares some
common ground.
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